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PRELIMINARY REMARKS
T he publication of a new book-length study of Shinran in English is welcomed by those of us who feel that Shinran merits more attention in Buddhist studies in the West. Unfortunately, I find Keel’s work to repeat in 
most cases the standard interpretation of most Nishi Hongwanji-sponsored 
philosophy. In the respects in which Keel diverges from the ‘party line’ he may 
be overlaying Christian hopes on Shinran’s texts. This is perhaps his intent 
and the meaning of the subtitle, “ a dialogical approach.” To put it positively, 
this book provides a record of an informed appropriation of Jodo Shinshu 
Buddhism from the perspective of a liberal Protestant ideology.
If I am correct in seeing Dr. Hee-Sung Keel’s engaging treatment of Shinran 
as a friendly Protestant appropriation, this may be one of the book’s virtues.
What I always hope for in a new study of Shinran is an accurate vision of 
his insight into the nature of nembutsu with a forceful and innovative elab­
oration of his religious experience and philosophy. The late Ueda Yoshifumi 
never ceased to reward such hopes.1 His long-time colleague, Dennis Hirota, 
also fulfills this hope with illuminating and challenging work each time he 
publishes.2 However, there is another type of study which can be of value to
* This is a review of Hee-Sung Keel, Understanding Shinran: A Dialogical A p­
proach [hereafter cited as Understanding] (Nanzan Studies in Asian Religions, Asian 
Humanities Press, Fremont California), pp. 210; ISBN 89581-937-6.
1 See, for example, “ The Mahayana Structure of Shinran’s Thought,” Ueda 
Yoshifumi, The Eastern Buddhist, vol. xvn, nos. 1 & 2 (Spring & Autumn 1984).
2 See, for example, “ Breaking the Darkness: Images of Reality in the Shin Buddhist
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our understanding of Shinran, an approach which makes common mistakes in 
interpretation while displaying the reasons for those mistakes. Keel’s work 
would fall in this latter category. This may sound like a backhanded compli­
ment, but I hope to show the value of such a study.
I believe that Keel has read Shinran’s texts with the presuppositions of the 
sectarian commentaries which proliferate Hongwanji-ha writings. In particu­
lar, he has assumed the perspective of the conservative Shinshu-gaku which 
Hongwanji-ha has sponsored over the last century and a half.* 3
Path,” Dennis Hirota, in Japanese Religions, 16-3 (January 1991), pp. 17-45.
3 Shinshu-gaku literally means simply the study of Jodo Shinshu. Therefore the 
works which I find trustworthy and illuminating of Shinran’s thought, those of Ueda 
Yoshifumi, Dennis Hirota, Alfred Bloom, James Dobbins, and Reverend Tokunaga 
Michio among others, might also be called Shinshu-gaku. Over the past century and a 
half, however, Shinshu-gaku has come to connote an approach to Jodo Shinshu which 
separates it from the general perspective of Mahayana Buddhism. This is particularly 
true of Hongwanji-ha sponsored educational institutions. In this review I will use “ con­
servative Shinshu-gaku” to name an approach to Shinran’s thought which tries to 
sever it from the matrix of Mahayana philosophy and religious experience which gave 
birth to it and which continues to nurture it wherever it is validly applied to Buddhist 
living.
4 Shinjin is a compound of shin-, which can usually be translated as faith where it ap­
pears unqualified, and jin, which is roughly “ heart and mind,” although better simply 
translated as one or the other in some contexts. As a compound, shinjin, it is an untrans­
latable technical term when used in regard to the Jodo Shinshu school of Buddhism. I 
elaborate shinjin as “ the encompassing heart and mind of true reliance.” This elabora­
tion is not intended as a term which can replace shinjin in translating Shinran’s texts. 
On the need to leave shinjin as an untranslated technical term in the study of Shinran’s 
thought see Notes on the Inscriptions on Sacred Scrolls (Kyoto: Shin Buddhist Transla­
tion Series [hereafter as sbts], Hongwanji International Center, 1981), pp. 77-82.
5 Besides Keel those scholars who wish to identify faith and shinjin include Minor L. 
Rogers and Ann T. Rogers (see Rennyo, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1991, 
pages 37-40) and Luis Gomez (see “ Shinran’s Faith and the Sacred Name of Amida,” 
Monumenta Nipponica, XXXVIII:!, pp. 73-84).
A major extension of this reading of Shinran according to the traditional or­
thodoxy is his insistence that shinjin can be equated nonproblematically with 
the term “ faith.” 4 This is an issue which seemingly will not die.5 Keel wishes 
to use the equation of shinjin and faith as a point of contact between Christian­
ity and Jodo Shinshu Buddhism for the purpose of mutual learning and 
growth. While a noble wish in itself such dialogue and mutual transformation 
between the two religious traditions must be based upon mutual respect.
Failure to respect fundamental differences in ontology, epistemology and
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logics of religious experience leads at best to the appropriation of one tradi­
tion by the other and more likely to the dismissal of one religious tradition 
by the other.6 When Professor Keel criticizes the best work on Shinran which 
this century has produced, his ideology is quite visible: “ Ueda Yoshifumi and 
Dennis Hirota’s Shinran: An Introduction to His Thought . . . devotes a 
good portion of the book to a discussion of Mahayana ontology as essential 
for understanding Shinran. But is this really necessary? To the extent that this 
question is answered in the affirmative, it appears to me that the unique value 
of Shinran’s thought is reduced” (p. 6). This seems to me to be misleading 
rhetoric. The “ unique value” of the thought of innovative figures in 
Mahayana Buddhist history comes from their educing new implications and 
radical applications of shared ontological, epistemological, and phenomeno­
logical commitments.
In the following I will look at Keel’s Understanding Shinran one chapter at 
a time. I will conclude my assessment in my response to his treatment of the re­
lation between Form and formlessness in Pure Land thought in his chapter 
five. My own view will have become very clear along the way. I encourage the 
reader to develop his or her own view of who Shinran was and just what he 
was endeavoring to teach.
CHAPTER ONE
Professor Keel devotes his first chapter to explaining the emergence of the 
popular Pure Land movement under Honen Shonin’s leadership. Keel, for 
liberal Christian reasons, wants to distance Shinran from mainstream or tradi­
tional Buddhism. Sectarian Jodo Shu and Jodo Shinshu writers have the same
6 In 1989 I attended a course on Zen Buddhism taught by Professor Masao Abe at 
the Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley. On the afternoon of November 23rd, he 
compared Jesus’ supposed obedience to God’s will in becoming a human with all the at­
tendant limitations to the self-emptying of Emptiness (Mu) in becoming all things. The 
next semester he developed this idea at some length in a course titled “ Self-emptying 
Emptiness and Kenotic Christ.” This is an example of a respectful appropriation of 
Christianity by a Buddhist thinker. For this view see “ Thomas J. J. Altizer’s Kenotic 
Christology and Buddhism,” in Masao Abe, Buddhism and Interfaith Dialogue 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995), pp. 151-158. The problem with this ap­
proach is that it does not present a version of Christianity which any practicing Chris­
tian is likely to affirm. This is similarly the case with Keel’s presentation of Shinran’s 
teaching as a path of faith in Other Power wherein the nembutsu is merely a container 
which carries the important thing, faith. This is not something which I, as a priest of 
Jodo Shinshu Hongwanji-ha, can recognize as Shinran’s teaching.
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objective for a very different reason. It is in the interests of sectarian Shin- 
shu writers to portray traditional Buddhism and other living schools of the 
Buddha-dharma as only accessible to persons of special ability. The liberal 
Christian who sees resonances of his or her ideology in Shinran would be well- 
served if preceding streams of Buddhist tradition could be shown to be oriented 
exclusively toward Enlightenment in this life, and therefore practicable only 
by persons of special genius and/or moral perfection.
Actually, it has been rare in Buddhist history for teachers to seriously expect 
their students to attain Buddhahood in this life. If we obscure the broad range 
of approaches to Buddhist living and the reasonable expectations held in most 
other schools, then our approach alone will seem tenable.
Professor Keel shares with sectarian Shinshu studies an argument against all 
other schools of Buddhism. In some cases conservative Shinshu-gaku makes 
the argument openly, in most cases it remains implicit only. Implicitly or 
explicitly the argument runs something like this: 1) Only Shinran’s teach­
ing amongst all of Buddhism is egalitarian and accessible to many people. 2) 
Shinran’s teaching rejects practice in favor of faith. 3) Therefore only salva- 
tion-by-faith religiosity is compassionately available to all of humankind. 
Sometimes the additional corollary is considered to be: 4) Shinran is really un­
knowingly a Christian. I have denied the first premise. As I go on to the 
further chapters of Keel’s book I will be especially concerned to deny the 
second premise. The practice of saying and or thinking upon the nembutsu in 
some such form as “ Namo Amida Butsu” /  “ I rely upon the Awakened One of 
unlimited Wisdom-light and Endless Life” is crucial to Shinran. He repeated­
ly denied that it is possible to extract something called faith from the activity of 
uttering the nembutsu.7
CHAPTER TWO
In chapter two Keel gives us a readable and engaging presentation of the stan­
dard Hongwanji-ha fleshing out of the sketchy details which we know about 
the biography of Shinran. For instance, he assumes that Shinran left Mount 
Hiei because he ‘‘found himself to be utterly incapable of following the tradi­
tional ‘difficult path’ because he found his passion-ridden nature hard to over­
come” (p. 32). Shinran never directly accounts for his leaving the monastic 
center in terms of some inability to practice.
Shinran at the age of 29 set off for a 100 day retreat at Rokkaku-do. The
1 Shinran expresses his view that the nembutsu is inseparable from shinjin in a num­
ber of places. See, for example, his oral teaching as recorded in the Tannisho: Dennis 
Hirota, Tannisho: A  Primer (Kyoto: Ryukoku University, 1982), p. 30.
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retreat led to a meditative vision in which Shinran received a message from a 
statue of Kannon, the Bodhisattva of Compassion, which he saw come alive 
and speak to him. Traditionally this has been referred to as a dream. I think 
that Professor Keel is closer to the mark than the standard interpretation by 
referring to it as a “ religious experience.” I believe that it was an experience of 
the Depths of Reality made possible through his successful completion of a 
prolonged meditative effort. While a “ religious experience” could still be a 
dream, the term points in the direction of an accomplishment through prac­
tice. It at least bears the mark of some special connection to what is Ultimate 
such as prophets and holy men in other religions are thought to have. While 
Keel has a better sense of this event’s meaning he still ends up with the stan­
dard interpretation of Shinran’s experience at Rokkaku-dd. In his accounting 
of Shinran’s “ religious experience” there it is no more than a way-station for 
a man incapable of rigorous practice. The encounter with the Bodhisattva Kan­
non at Rokkaku-do was certainly the result of Shinran’s efficacious retreat. 
Professor Keel quotes the message which this visualized Bodhisattva, in the 
form of Shotoku Taishi, gives to the 29 year-old pilgrim:
When the devotee finds himself bound by his past karma to come in 
contact with the female sex, I will incarnate myself as a most beauti­
ful woman and become his object of love; and throughout his life I 
will be his helpmate for the sake of embellishing this world, and on 
his death I will become his guide to the Land of Bliss.8 9
8 From the Godensho account of Shinran’s experience at Rokkaku-do. As quoted 
by Keel, Understanding, pp. 36-37.
9 The Jodo Wasan (Kyoto: Ryukoku Daigaku Translation Center, 1965), p. 133.
It is hard for me to see how Keel reconciles such a transformative religious ex­
perience at the outset of Shinran’s mission with his claim that “ Shinran 
‘desacralized’ the world to a certain degree by purging it of the supernatural ac­
tivities of unseen forces . . . ” (p. 70).
It seems to me that Professor Keel would like to present Shinran as a 
modern anonymous Christian. Like the promulgators of conservative 
Shinshu-gaku, Keel avoids discussing in detail Shinran’s teaching regarding 
the benefits received in this life by those who say the nembutsu. When he does 
address the issue briefly he refers to the list of ten benefits listed in the Ken 
Jodo Shinjitsu Kyogyosho Monrui (Kyogyoshinsho), and not the list which 
appears in the Jodo Wasan. The Jodo Wasan represent Shinran’s mature 
thought. They were written when he was in his eighties. While the Kyogyo- 
shinsho must be preferred to other writings where the texts differ substantially 
in content, the two lists of ten benefits are essentially the same. The one signifi-
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cant difference is the Wasan’s including as a benefit received from saying the 
nembutsu that “ untimely death (is avoided).’’9 This is clearly a material 
benefit. It is a reward discerned and perhaps received by a man who walked 
through a world which was sacred. Shinran found himself at all times to be 
surrounded by ‘good gods’, Bodhisattvas and Buddhas in transformation 
bodies.
10 The most reliable of the detailed treatments of Shinran’s life in English remains 
Alfred Bloom, “ The Life of Shinran Shonin: The Journey to Self Acceptance,” 
Numen 15 (1968).
11 See n. 7 above.
12 Letters o f Shinran (SBTS, 1978), p. 39; also in Dennis Hirota et al., trans., The Col­
lected Works o f Shinran (cws), two volumes (Kyoto: Jodo Shinshu Hongwanji-ha, 
1997), 1:537.
Although chapter two is one of the most readable and concise accounts of 
Shinran’s life available in English,1 01 have gone to some length in charting the 
conventionality of Professor Keel’s rendering. I believe that his Protestant ide­
ology has led him away from acknowledging how characteristically Japanese 
Shinran was, and how Buddhist. I think that this is because Keel has read Shin­
ran too much through the filter of modern Shinshu-gaku, which also wants to 
turn its eyes away from aspects of Shinran’s teaching which it considers to be 
superstitious.
At times, Keel allows the filter of conservative Shinshu-gaku to blind him to 
aspects of Shinran’s perspective which are actually quite clear in the corpus of 
his works. An unfortunate error in Professor Keel’s understanding of both 
Honen and Shinran appears near the end of chapter two: “ (Tjhe entire focus 
in Shinran shifts from the nenbutsu as practice to faith in Other Power . . . 
for Honen too, the Vow is ultimately more important than the nenbutsu” (p. 
61).
It would seem obvious that Honen treated the nembutsu as a matter of ulti­
mate concern. As we have seen, Shinran’s view was that the nembutsu is ut­
terly inseparable from shinjin. From his oral teachings this insistence has been 
preserved in the Tannisho:
This is the inconceivable power of the Name. Since it is also none 
other than the inconceivable working of the Vow, the two are wholly 
one.11
The following passage from Shinran’s letters also makes the point forcefully:
[Tjhere is no nembutsu separate from shinjin, nor is the one moment 
of shinjin separate from the one moment of nembutsu.12
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Keel has been misled by the argumentative way in which Hongwanji-ha dog­
matics lauds Shinran’s elaborations of shinjin in contrast to Jodo Shu, the 
Pure Land streams of Tendai and Shingon, Chinese Buddhism, etc. These lat­
ter schools and their masters are criticized as being practice-centric and lost in 
jiriki (self-power). Shinshu-gaku is at odds with itself at this point, obscuring 
Shinran’s emphasis on the practice of the nembutsu as inseparable from shin­
jin in order to criticize other schools’ approach to the nembutsu.
Shinran was a visionary, a man of profound religious experience. Saying 
the nembutsu in some form or reflecting upon it silently was for him an en­
counter with the Compassionate Depths of Reality coming forth for his 
benefit. The practice might be saying reverently and aloud, “Kimyo jinjippo 
mugeko Nyorai.” It might be the half-conscious muttering of “ Namanda” in 
a moment of tender appreciation of the Goodness which he found pouring 
into his life. Shinran taught and transmitted the practice of saying the nem­
butsu as the flowing of Amida Buddha’s compassion into our lives. I could 
not agree more with Professor Dennis Hirota when he says:
[Sjhinjin and practice are two and yet inseparable. Thus in develop­
ing Honen’s nembutsu teaching by declaring shinjin to be the true 
cause of birth in the Pure Land, Shinran in fact magnified the prob­
lem of explaining the role, and even the necessity, of saying the 
Name.13
This understanding of Shinran contrasts sharply with Keel’s view that “ the en­
tire focus in Shinran shifts from nenbutsu as a practice to faith in Other Pow­
er” (p. 60).
In the Buddhist religion practices are taken up as a way of transforming the 
way in which we perceive the world. Whether we call it faith or not, shinjin is 
a renewed way of seeing the world. This transformative experience of entrust­
ing is, as we have seen in Shinran’s own writings, inseparable from the prac­
tice of saying or thinking upon the Name (nembutsu). As inseparable from the 
practice of saying the nembutsu, Shinran’s elaboration of shinjin is not open to 
appropriation by those who follow religious paths which do not include the 
nembutsu. It is just such an appropriation which I suspect Professor Keel be­
lieves is possible when he tells us: “ Now it is not the nenbutsu as such that is 
crucial, but the power of the Vow as the expression of Amida’s compassion, 
and hence our complete trust and faith in it” (p. 66).
This seems to me to be an attempt to see all religions as based on some faith
13 Dennis Hirota “ Shinran’s View of Language,” The Eastern Buddhist, vol. XXVI 
no. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 93.
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which is conceived to be the same, no matter how the concept of the object of 
devotion may differ from one tradition to another. I think that this vague 
“ faith” is the last stand of a sort of Universalism that trivializes not only the 
distinctions between different religions, but the religions themselves. I can ap­
preciate the Christian’s encounter with Jesus through the Eucharist. Nonethe­
less, it would be meaningless for me to try to appropriate the Eucharist as a 
Buddhist. I ’m glad that Professor Keel can appreciate Shinran’s teaching, but 
it is all about saying the nembutsu. It cannot be torn out of the living context 
of that practice.
CHAPTER THREE
The quality of Professor Keel’s treatment of Shinran’s thought diminishes in 
chapter three. A long harangue on the greater relevance of faith (shinjin) as 
contrasted to nembutsu constitutes most of the chapter’s 39 pages. At times 
his argument is hard to follow. Keel quotes a later passage of the same letter I 
referred to near the end of the last section:
[Tjhere is no shinjin separate from nenbutsu; this is the teaching I 
have received. You should know further that there can be no nen­
butsu separate from shinjin. Both should be understood to be 
Amida’s Vow. Nenbutsu and shinjin on our part are themselves 
manifestations of the Vow.14
Professor Keel ignores the obvious import of the letter: shinjin and nembutsu 
are inseparable aspects of the same Buddhist practice. Somehow he concludes 
that Shinran is lauding “ faith” over practice: “ While this passage apparently 
emphasizes the inseparability, and even the equal importance, of faith and the 
practice of nenbutsu, in fact the last sentence of the statement, ‘Nenbutsu and 
faith on our part are themselves manifestations of the Vow’, already implies 
that it is after all faith that should be given precedence” (p. 81).
Keel’s logic here is obscure. He apparently presumes a temporal priority for 
“ faith.” Perhaps this is something he has picked up from modern Hon- 
gwanji-ha commentators. The notion of a temporal priority for shinjin as op­
posed to nembutsu never appears in Shinran’s works. In a very real sense he 
does emphasize the nembutsu in a way he never emphasizes shinjin. He 
repeats Honen’s teaching “ just say the nembutsu” many times. As his advice 
is recorded in the Tannisho we find Shinran telling disciples who have taken a 
long and dangerous journey to receive his counsel:
14 Letters, p. 40; see cws 1:538.
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“ Just say the Name and be saved by Amida” ; nothing else is in­
volved.15
15 Tannisho: A Primer, pp. 22-23.
16 Ueda Yoshifumi and Dennis Hirota, Monumenta Nipponica, xxxvm:4, p. 416.
Even though shinjin and nembutsu are inseparable from a Buddhist perspec­
tive there is a pastoral preference for nembutsu. It is a typically Buddhist orien­
tation to emphasize practice and not faith. An emphasis on practice, such as 
“ just say the nembutsu,” leads away from the sort of self-consciousness 
which causes us to freeze up and lose the fluid way of saying the Name which is 
the essence of Jodo Shinshu. An emphasis on having faith or gratitude engen­
ders such self-consciousness. Even so, this is just a pastoral preference. The 
doctrinal position of Shinran and those who follow his guidance is that there 
is no shinjin without the nembutsu.
Keel wants to understand shinjin by means of the category of “ faith.” I 
have no problem with that. Shinjin can be understood as a sort of faith, so 
long as we also understand it in terms of the categories of religious experience 
and transformation of identity. Shinjin is an experience of the depths of reali­
ty, of our ultimate concern, in a brief instant. This momentary encounter with 
Amida Buddha has a more lasting effect, but the exact duration and degree of 
change in how we feel about the world and act in it depends greatly on karmic 
factors. Further, shinjin establishes a transformation in our identity in the one 
thought-moment of its initial receipt. From that moment onward one aspect 
of who we are is the Project of Universal Liberation (Hongari) itself. We 
may not feel identical with this new identity centered in vastness very often, 
nor may it be an item of our conscious experience. Even so the one moment of 
receiving shinjin establishes our truest center of being in Buddha-nature. This 
is the profound implication of shinjin being the true and real mind of Amida.
Professor Keel’s position that shinjin is merely faith, rather than my posi­
tion that “ faith” names one of several categories needed to illumine its mean­
ing, has been put forward many times. I find the argument of Ueda Yoshifumi 
and Dennis Hirota persuasive in rejecting such an approach. Their essential 
point is that shinjin cannot merely be faith because “ shinjin refers funda­
mentally to the true and real mind of Amida, not an attitude of the mind of 
man.” 16 Shinran is talking about a vast encompassing reality when he speaks 
about our being taken into the Buddha’s mind in shinjin. When he explains its 
aspect of being sincere mind (shishiri) he uses the Nirvana Sutra to verify that it 
is the Buddha (Tathagata), that it is Buddha-nature and as such is like Bound­
less Space:
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The true and real is Tathagata; Tathagata is the true and real. The 
true and real is boundless space; boundless space is the true and real. 
The true and real is Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is the true and 
real.17
17 The True Teaching, Practice, and Realization o f  the Pure Land Way (sbts, 1985), 
p. 233; see cws 1:97.
18 Notes on the Inscriptions on the Sacred Scrolls, Appendix, “ On Shinjin and 
Faith,” p. 78.
As contrasted with this boundless reality which Shinran explains shinjin to 
be, faith on Professor Keel’s view is a purely subjective matter: “ it is obvious 
to everyone that faith is, after all, a certain state of mind” (p. 83).
I have serious doubts that faith can be understood simply as a “ state of 
mind” even when looking at a theistic tradition such as the Christian. It seems 
to me that faith is the actual commitment to ultimate (or near ultimate) con­
cerns and the nurturing trust and confidence which flows from this engage­
ment with something deeper and broader than oneself. Such a reality of faith 
has transpersonal, superpersonal, and unconscious dimensions. It is also inti­
mately connected to certain wholesome proclivities to act in the world. Keel 
quotes key passages in Shinran’s letters which describe the movement away 
from self-centeredness and toward wholesome living which comes with shin­
jin. Even so, he reverts to a subjective “ state of mind” analysis of faith. In the 
broader sense in which I am discussing faith, it can be seen as one category 
which helps to illumine the reality of shinjin, so long as we balance it with 
other categories, such as those of religious experience and transformation in 
identity. Even the editors of the Shin Buddhism Translation Series of which 
Professor Hirota is the chief translator allow that “ faith” conveys a portion 
of what shinjin is:
“ [Fjaith” expresses certain aspects of shinjin—such as entrusting or 
being free of doubt . . .  18
But “ expressing certain aspects” does not make shinjin identical with faith, 
certainly not with the sort of faith which Keel describes as a “ state of mind.”
In his analysis of what he calls “ faith” Professor Keel begins to make a dis­
tinction between receiving shinjin and shinjin’s becoming settled in one’s life. 
He equivocates between “ settled” as “ matured and bearing effects” and “ set­
tled” in the sense of “ one’s ultimate destiny having been decided.” In the 
former sense there is some meaningful distinction to be made between receiv­
ing shinjin and its settling into or bearing fruits in one’s daily living. However, 
Keel finally despairs of finding such a distinction clearly made in Shinran’s
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writings. He ends up embracing what he feels is the Hongwanji-ha orthodox 
opinion—shinjin is settled in the same moment it is received. If we mean by 
“ settled” that one’s birth into the Pure and Happy Land of Amida in the next 
life has been determined, then the orthodox opinion would seem to be that 
receipt of shinjin and being “ settled” occur in the same moment. At least this 
is my opinion and what I see as the teaching of Shinran. But there is some sort 
of distinction between having had the one thought-moment of shinjin which 
settles the matter of one’s next birth and its bearing its effect in a more mature 
way of living. Whether Shinran’s use of “sadamaru” or “ketsujo” parallels 
this distinction adequately or not, Keel’s intuition that some such distinction 
is valid and necessary is correct. This is one more point where his sense of Shin­
ran’s vision drives him toward saying something interesting and perhaps valua­
ble, but his reliance upon the filter of Hongwanji-ha’s traditional dogmatics 
prevents him from completing his thought.
Keel spends the latter part of chapter three and much of the rest of the book 
worrying whether “ Shinran is not reverting . . .  to the traditional Mahayana 
view of the identity between beings and the Buddha, thereby weakening the 
sense of their infinite distance that compelled him to kneel down before the 
grace of Other Power in the first place” (p. 103). I believe that this concern is 
based on a misunderstanding of Shinran and of what we may call the classical 
view of developed Mahayana Buddhism. The problem comes from an exces­
sive emphasis on ontology, the philosophical elaboration of what exists, and 
ontological truth-claims, assertions of metaphysical fact. This Christian em­
phasis has little to do with Buddhism, which is practice-centric. Buddhism, in­
sofar as it engages in ontology at all, denies the existence of a distance between 
beings and Buddhas, samsara (the tedious round of unenlightened birth fol­
lowed by death and rebirth in a realm of delusion) and Nirvana (freedom, 
bliss, purity, and true self-possession). Shinran does not deviate from this 
view of Buddhist ‘ontology’. Whereas Christianity locates the problem with 
the human condition as ontological, a fall from grace resulting in a restricted 
and unsatisfactory human nature which can be healed only through Christ, 
for Buddhism the problem does not lie in ontology or the actual and ultimate 
conditions of Reality and the world. The Buddhist tradition identifies our 
problem as ignorance and the distress-generating craving that this ignorance 
produces. We might say that the problem is psychological or existential. 
Perhaps Keel is troubled by authors like Alan Watts who believed that since 
there is no ultimate distance between Nirvana and samsara all Buddhists have 
to do is tell themselves that this is the case. It is not so simple as that. Realiza­
tion of the Truth is a difficult and elusive matter. It is not a matter of either/ 
or, there is or is not a distance between beings and Buddha, it is a both-and 
situation. Yoshifumi Ueda and Dennis Hirota provide a good background ex-
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planation in their volume, Shinran: An Introduction to his Thought. Keel is 
badly mistaken in thinking that this Mahayana context is unnecessary to un­
derstanding Shinran’s vision. Let me quote briefly one of their elaborations of 
the relation between samsara and Nirvana:
In Mahayana thought, one goes out from samsara and attains nir­
vana, but this at the same time means that one breaks through their 
duality. Thus, the bodhisattva path is characterized by two contra­
dictory elements. On the one hand, samsara and nirvana or blind 
passions and enlightened wisdom stand in mutually exclusive opposi­
tion. As long as one is possessed of blind passions and false discrimi­
nation, one is not enlightened, and in order to attain enlightenment, 
one must rid oneself of them. Nirvana is attained by negating and 
transcending samsaric existence. On the other hand, the nirvana thus 
attained is nondiscriminative wisdom that no longer views samsara 
and nirvana dichotomously. The bodhisattva realizes wisdom, and 
through it returns to life in this world.19
19 Yoshifumi Ueda and Dennis Hirota, Shinran: A n  Introduction to His Thought 
(Kyoto: Hongwanji International Center, 1989), p. 83.
20 Our identity with Amida Buddha, with all things Nirvanic, follows from the ‘onto­
logical’ principle that Samsara is Nirvana. Besides this principle, shared by all schools 
of Mahayana Buddhism, there is in the Pure Land stream of tradition the notion that 
our liberation was effected by Amida Buddha ten kalpas ago. The exact metaphysical 
and even existential implications of this can be quite complex. Nonetheless, the classi­
cal presentation of this view is in the Anjinketsujosho, translated by Dennis Hirota, 
The Eastern Buddhist, vol. XXIII no. 2 (Autumn 1990) and vol. XXIV no. 1 (Spring 
1991).
This fundamental Mahayana Buddhist perspective, in which we are each the 
deathless Ocean of Life but suffer because we do not know this fully and di­
rectly, informs Shinran’s vision. The deludedness in which we are bound 
alienates us from our identity with the Buddha, but this identity has been a 
fact from the inconceivably distant past.20 This alienation from our unity with 
what is ultimately true and real is psychological, phenomenological, epistemo­
logical, even existential, but it is not ontological in the sense that sinfulness is, 
as it is explained by the Christian tradition. Sin has split us from our righteous 
relation to God on the usual Christian view, and it is only through the Christ- 
act that we can be realigned. On the Buddhist view we are always one with the 
Great Ocean of Life. Our lives are at all times something better than we can 
imagine. All persons, places and events are at all times one with a luminous, 
deathless, utterly free, magically empty, universally interpenetrating, nonsub-
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stantial Oneness. Shinran’s sincere emphasis on our being lost and our need to 
receive shinjin from Amida Buddha is based on a sensitivity to this epistemic 
and existential condition, not upon a nonbuddhist or antibuddhistic ontology 
that posits separate selves who could be “ an infinite distance” from that 
which is True and Real.
Shinran goes so far as to credit our own past karma with the fact that we en­
counter the Pure Land teaching, say the nembutsu and receive shinjin:
For vast ages in the past, under Buddhas who appeared in this world 
three times the sands of the Ganges in number, we awakened the 
great thought of enlightenment of self-power. Having performed 
good practices numerous as the sands of the Ganges, we are now able 
to encounter the karmic power of the great Vow.21
This view is certainly not compatible with the “ infinite distance” which Keel 
mistakes Shinran to have “ initially posited between sentient beings and the 
Buddha” (p. 147). Having taken up the nembutsu practice in great seriousness 
under Honen’s guidance Shinran found himself to have received shinjin. This 
shinjin was the mind and heart of great compassion which had encompassed 
him from the distant past. In saying the nembutsu the illusory distance, aliena­
tion and suffering were torn away for the briefest instant of time. That instant 
recurred over and over in Shinran’s life as he continued to say the nembutsu. 
His career was dedicated to sharing this practice and this healing religious ex­
perience with us. This is something very different from preaching faith in an 
infinitely distant absolute.
CHAPTER FOUR
Chapter four finds Professor Keel explaining the “ life of faith” which Shin­
ran holds out to us. He correctly states that “ faith brings about a change of 
heart and of our attitude toward life and the world” (p. 143). Keel quotes 
enough passages from Shinran’s writings (from the Shin Buddhism Transla­
tion Series) to clearly establish that a change in one’s behavior, moral and 
otherwise, does occur when the nembutsu is taken deeply to heart. Professor 
Keel, for example, quotes this passage from Shinran’s Letters as proof that 
one’s behavior is changed through shinjin:
[Sjince you have begun to hear the Buddha’s Vow you have gradual­
ly rejected the three poisons, and come to prefer at all times the medi­
cine of Amida Buddha. (CWS, p. 553, as quoted in Understanding, p. 
145)
21 Notes on the Essentials o f  Faith A lone (SBTS, 1979), p. 47; see cws 1:464.
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Professor Keel can see how incompatible Shinran’s view is with the sort of con­
servative Shinshu-gaku which insists that we are unchanged, morally and 
otherwise, along the path of saying the nembutsu and receiving shinjin. 
However, Shinran’s view of moving gradually away from the poisons of obses­
sive greed, hatred and self-delusion is equally incompatible with Keel’s read­
ing of Shinran as “ otherworldly” and dualistic: “ The ethical tension arising 
from the unbridgeable gap between the absolute and the relative, the Buddha 
and sentient beings, is intrinsic to Shinran’s concept of faith” (p. 147).
As we have seen, there is no unbridgeable gap between the relative and that 
which is most worthy and profound, what Keel calls the absolute. Rather sam- 
sara is Nirvana, this world is the Lotus land and we are all potentially Bud­
dhas. There is an existential, experiential gap but that too is healed in the one 
thought-moment of shinjin. While not thoroughly Awakened to the inter­
penetrating, nonsubstantial Oneness of all persons, places and events, the per­
son who has experienced shinjin has had a taste of purity and Truth. The gap 
in conduct is important to Shinran, a gap between deluded and self-centered 
beings, like myself, and the Bodhisattva project of Dharmakara (who became 
Amida Buddha through an unimaginable period of pure actions). But Bud­
dhist conduct is itself a more relative matter than the deontological ethics 
proffered my most Christian theologians. Limitations in our conduct, 
precepts, are taken up as a form of training, as a means of Awakening. There 
is no absolute right and wrong in Buddhist tradition. There is a very different 
coloration to Shinran’s disappointment in his own imperfect conduct and a 
Christian who sins and knows he is doing that which is absolutely evil.
Shinran’s understanding of his own lostness is not in terms of a contrasting 
faithfulness to some moral rules known to be correct. It is rather that he con­
trasted this moral uncertainty with his encountering what is fundamentally 
true and real in and as the practice of the nembutsu:
I know nothing of what is good or evil, for if I could know thor­
oughly as is known in the mind of Amida, that an act was good, then 
I would know the meaning of “ good.” If I could know thoroughly, 
as Amida knows, that an act was evil, then I would know “ evil.” But 
for a foolish being full of blind passions, in this fleeting world—this 
burning house—all matters without exception are lies and gibberish, 
totally without truth and sincerity. The nembutsu alone is true and 
real.22
If I look for parallels in the Christian tradition to the experience which Shin-
22 Tannisho: A Primer, p. 44.
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ran relates above I find one in Catholicism and not so clearly in the Protestant 
sphere. The feeling of encountering that which is “ alone true and real” in a 
discrete activity, saying the nembutsu, seems sacramental to me.
Indeed the experience which is related in the above quoted passage of the 
Tannisho may have parallels to the Christian who receives the Eucharist while 
believing that it is the body of Christ. The literal meaning which the commu­
nion wafer’s identity with Christ is said to have in Catholicism is seldom 
present in Protestantism. I believe that it is a similarly magical identity of the 
nembutsu and Amida Buddha himself which underlies Shinran’s religious ex­
perience. Understood in this way, it should be clear why I am opposing Keel’s 
dismissal of the nembutsu’s importance in favor of “ faith.” You cannot 
separate shinjin, the encompassing heart and mind of true reliance, from the 
nembutsu practice in which alone it is realized. This would be like removing 
the Communion wafer from the sacramental context in which it is consecrat­
ed. Shinran’s feeling about the sanctity of the nembutsu resembles in some 
ways the devout Catholic’s reverence for the Communion wafer. It is this 
sense of sanctity which surrounds the practice of the nembutsu which has led 
me to describe it as a sacramental speech-act.23 It is significant in this regard to 
keep in mind that Shinran is not recalled as having said that “ Faith alone is 
true and real.” The direct object of his religious experience, the focus of sanc­
tity, was the practice of saying Amida’s name. This is why he told those close 
to him that “ the nembutsu alone is true and real.”
CHAPTER FIVE
The topic of Keel’s final chapter is “ form and formlessness.” It seems to me 
that he looks at the issue too much in terms of a kind of generic Mahayana 
world view. This is just the mistake he attributes to Professors Ueda and Hiro- 
ta. But Ueda Yoshifumi and Dennis Hirota never project a perspective onto 
Shinran’s writings that isn’t there. I feel that Professor Keel does this to some 
extent when he elucidates Shinran’s reading of the Dharmakara narrative or 
what he calls the “ Pure Land story.” To bolster his own ideology he presents 
a reading of “ emptiness” as background for the Pure Land stream of 
tradition’s notion of Amida and his land genuinely existing as “ wondrous 
being” (myo u):
In the world of emptiness, indeed, all forms and names disappear 
and there is no place for a story such as we find in the Pure Land
23 In this regard see “Nembutsu as a Sacramental Speech-act,” Wheel o f Dharma, 
Buddhist Churches of America, San Francisco, 1995.
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sutras. All the distinctions we make in our lives lose their meaning 
and validity. Emptiness, however, is not mere nothingness, the abso­
lute non-existence of anything, it is at the same time a world full of 
forms and names in their purity and rich variety. Form is emptiness; 
emptiness is form. Emptiness is a dynamic reality of diversity teem­
ing with names and concepts, forms and characteristics. Neither 
being nor non-being, these forms are called wondrous beings (myo u), 
“ forms without form .” According to Tan Luan, it is in this world of 
wondrous beings that the Pure Land story, with its magnificent 
forms and features of Amida Buddha and his Land, finds its legiti­
mate ontological place. The forms of the Pure Land story are not to 
be taken as real forms but as “ forms without form ,” wondrous 
beings. (Understanding, p. 158)
I would like to make two sorts of comments about this passage. Firstly, why 
does Keel feel it is necessary to elaborate the non-nihilistic meaning of empti­
ness? Isn’t he relying on standard Mahayana interpretations of “ ontology” 
when it suits his ideology while criticizing, e.g., Ueda and Hirota, for doing 
the same thing? Secondly, how does he get from Amida and his Land existing 
in the mode of wondrous being to the statement that they “ are not to be taken 
as real forms” ? On Mahayana principles the reality of all forms is their empti­
ness, as Keel has taken the trouble to mention. Therefore to be a “ real form” 
is to be empty, or to exist wondrously as T’an-luan suggests. If Keel means 
“ objectified,” “ falsely substantialized” or some such thing by “ real” he is 
misusing the English language. English grammar does not prejudge ontologi­
cal principles. The way in which “ real” would modify a term in English is to 
affirm its genuineness and reliability. On basic Mahayana principles, with or 
without T ’an-luan’s notion of myo u or “ wondrous being,” Amida and his 
land are the most real of forms by the very fact of their non-objectifiability.
I feel that there is a similar misunderstanding of the Buddhist notion of skill­
ful means in Keel’s explanation of it. The matter is not so clear cut as in his 
misuse of the concept “ real forms,” but I am quite unhappy with the follow­
ing passage:
[Tjhere definitely exists an ontological disparity between the world of 
the Pure Land story and the world of realization (sho). The latter can­
cels out the former. Or, to put the matter more paradoxically, the 
Pure Land renders the Pure Land story itself meaningless. From the 
enlightened perspective, therefore the story is nothing more than an 
expedient or temporary means (hoberi) to lead ignorant and sinful 
beings to an enlightenment that, once realized, has no use for the ex­
pedient. The Pure Land story is for the enlightened of the Pure Land
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an “ unreal” means for realizing “ reality.” It is no more than a 
dream, except that it has within it the power to wake people up from 
it! It is a dream from which one has to wake up, but nonetheless a 
necessary dream! (pp. 161-162)
There is certainly no language in any text by Shinran such as “ the Pure 
Land is an ‘unreal’ means. Shinran never did nor would have said anything 
like “ the Pure Land renders the Pure Land story itself meaningless.” These 
are projections of a confused grasp of generic Mahayana notions of what “ ex­
pedient means” and “ reality” might be onto the thought of a Buddhist 
philosopher who would revile such statements. I would say that the Pure Land 
is the most real of places because it is, in the language of the Dai Muryoju- 
kyo, “ the place of no place.” The Pure Land story is the most sacred and reli­
able of explanations because it unravels any materialistic or dualistic presuppo­
sitions to which its listeners might be attached. This is what I would say as 
Jodo Shinshu minister. I will leave the reader to find the innumerable passages 
of Shinran’s writings with harmonize with my view. I would challenge Profes­
sor Keel to find any language in Shinran’s writings compatible with the reduc­
tionists view he takes of the Pure Land via concepts of “ emptiness” and 
“ skillful means.” These concepts are important and do occur in Shinran’s 
texts. Even so, there is a tendency to assess Buddhist thinkers in terms of highly 
edited and homogenized versions of medieval scholastic Buddhist thought. 
Current scholarship has disclosed the plurality amongst the tributaries of that 
medieval scholasticism and the complexity of the branches of Buddhist 
thought and practice which have developed subsequently. What Shinran ac­
tually does with notions like “ Glorified Buddha-body” is more relevant than 
our rounded-off notions of emptiness and skillful means.
Several pages later Professor Keel is much more faithful to Shinran. I don’t 
understand how he could consider the passage which I have just quoted to be 
compatible with this more accurate elaboration of Shinran’s view:
For Shinran, forms and characteristics, at least those that comprise 
the Pure Land story, are grounded in the very nature of reality and 
are thus inseparable from it. Hence there is ultimately no ontological 
disparity between the Pure Land story and the world of realization 
(enlightenment). The forms of the Pure Land story arise from the ac­
tivity of the nameless reality, the Dharma-body (dharmakaya) or 
Suchness (p. 165)
While I would agree with the flavor of this passage and not the previous 
reductionist view, it employs only the two-body view of Amida which Shinran 
took from T ’an-luan. Shinran also relies upon the more traditional three-
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bodies of all Buddhas view. Using this framework Shinran clearly identifies 
Amida as a Sambhogakaya, or Buddha of a Bliss-body. Whichever concept we 
use—Bliss body (Sambhogakaya) or Dharma-body of Compassionate means 
(Hoben hosshiri)—Amida is one of many. However, this is easy to remember 
with the three-body model since it is used in so many other schools of Bud­
dhism in talking about various Buddhas. Professor Keel’s understanding on 
this point is in need of the Mahayana trikaya, or three body model, as is John 
Cobb’s, whose notion that “ Amida is Christ’’ he quotes with approval (p. 
180).
Keel may be drawn to such an identification of Amida and the Christ by his 
own beliefs. But it requires an absolutization of Amida which is inappropri­
ate. Christian notions like “ transcendent” and “ absolute” keep cropping up 
in his discussion of Amida. It is relevant that he wanted to downplay the liter­
alism of the “ Pure Land story” which has Amida Buddha originating as a 
renunciant king, a human being with no more of a transcendent origin than 
you or I. The modern dichotomy of “ literal” versus “ symbolic” or 
“ metaphorical” does not apply well to Shinran or any Buddhist author from 
previous centuries. I would like to emphasize that Shinran took the story of 
the renunciant become Bodhisattva Dharmakara very seriously. If the reader 
must identify taking a story “ very seriously” with a literal interpretation so be 
it. So long as we keep the Dharmakara narrative in mind and recall its impor­
tance to Shinran and subsequent Jodo Shinshu tradition I think that we can­
not accept the conclusion which Professor Keel comes to: “ If Amida is Christ, 
then the two traditions should also recognize the common transcendent origin 
of the two mediators of salvation” (p. 181).
Whether the Buddhist mediator is seen as primarily Amida as with Cobb or 
Shakyamuni as Keel goes on to suggest, these and all Buddhas have a human 
origin. If Professor Keel sees the Buddhist view as being that their ultimate ori­
gin is in a formless realm we must remember that this is also true for you and 
I, for the computer on which I am writing this and the journal from which you 
are reading it. This is the implication of the “ form is emptiness” view which 
he felt it necessary to elaborate as background to the perspective of T ’an-luan 
and Shinran. This is one sort of model for understanding the Buddhist 
metaphysical stance. We also need a model which is respectful of the concrete 
narrative background for any person, including persons who awaken to 
become Buddhas. This is one of several points where Keel’s view is slanted by 
working with only one model of understanding where a Buddhist thinker like 
Shinran is using two or more conceptual models.24
24 One model needed to explain birth in the Pure Land is the one given by Keel near
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There is a fundamental dissimilarity between Buddhism in all its schools 
and the Christian tradition. The principle that samsara is Nirvana is fun­
damental to Mahayana Buddhist thought. Shinran did not see a transcendent 
reality expressed in Shakyamuni or Amida. Even Amida Buddha is merely the 
culmination of our own shared humanness, the fulfillment of the true poten­
tial of this realm—not the mediator of some transcendent realm. “ Formless­
ness,” in Mahayana Buddhism, is not the name for a separate transcendent 
realm. Rather “ formless” is an adjective which modifies anything in this 
world or another which has released its sense of separateness. Thus if we want 
to understand what “ formless true reality” was for Shinran we should try to 
understand that the nembutsu which he uttered has an aspect of formlessness. 
As Dennis Hirota has explained:
[TJhe Name has the character of form that is at the same time form­
less reality, of language that is pervaded by the silence of astonish­
ment or inconceivability.* 25
the end of his book: “ [Tjhose who are born (ojo) in the pure land will completely shed
their finite and impermanent forms, their individualities, and be one with the formless
dharmakaya as suchness” (p. 181). Shinran also uses a model of our becoming particu­
lar Buddhas, retaining our individuality, and returning to liberate those with whom we
have a close connection. See, in this regard, chapter five of the Tannisho in Tannisho:
A Primer, p. 25.
25 “ Shinran’s View of Language” (II), The Eastern Buddhist, vol. xxvi no. 2 (Au­
tumn 1993), p. 103.
This, I believe, is a correct understanding of what “ formless reality” was 
for Shinran. Ours is not a path in which we are rescued by a savior from some 
transcendent realm because of our faith. This path is one in which the true na­
ture of all reality is brought home to us by a Buddha, Amida, who started out 
as a deluded person in the realm of desire just like ourselves. Amida will be 
able to assist us in thoroughly realizing the unsurpassable worthiness of earth 
and all realms when we leave behind the limits of our current lives. At that 
time, when we are born into his Pure Land, we will realize that there are no 
transcendent realms. Awakening in the Pure Land of Amida we will discern in 
a thoroughgoing manner that all persons, places, and events are inseparable 
aspects of a luminous, deathless, universally interpenetrating, utterly free, 
magically empty, nonsubstantial Oneness. For the time being, if we open our­
selves to the nembutsu, we have shinjin. A model of faith will disclose some 
part of what shinjin is, perhaps 20% of the story. A more important model is 
the model of religious experience. We can see what Professor Hirota calls the 
nembutsu’s being “ pervaded by the silence of astonishment or inconceivabi-
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lity” in Shinran’s statement that “ the nembutsu alone is true and real.” It is as 
an exemplar of religious experience which Shinran is best remembered. It is be­
cause he experienced the nembutsu as the coming-forth of the most worthy 
and reliable aspects of Reality that he did not emphasize repeated utterance in 
the way his teacher Honen did. Encountering that which is beyond all descrip­
tions as Kimyo jinjippo mugeko Nyorai, as Namu Amida Butsu as the practice 
of saying the nembutsu in its various forms, he endeavored to share that 
religious experience with as many people as possible.
Understanding Shinran is useful in presenting a rather standard view of 
Shinran and a view of his teachings which diverges only slightly from the view 
which presents itself as the orthodoxy of Hongwanji-ha. It is intriguing that it 
could wind up praising John Cobb’s view that “ Amida is Christ.” Perhaps 
the author should not have saved his radical views for the end.
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